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cApitALiSm And ethnicity FAcing A riSing wAve 
oF communiSm in nepAL
The difference of vocations among various cultural groups and its implications for economic 
differentials have grave imprints on political and social movements, yet these have been largely 
ignored by economists, anthropologists and political scientists. While their strategic social 
positioning is evident, entrepreneurial and business groups have been especially elusive groups for 
ethnographers to access. On the one hand, business elites are the biggest beneficiaries of economic 
and social change; and on the other hand, they are known for their cold adherence to monetary 
calculations, which makes them one of the biggest obstacles when it comes to ushering in any 
form of social change.  Although the pragmatic forces defining this class group speaks for the way 
they tend to willingly cooperate with political regimes of any credentials and ideologies that hold 
power, their engagements with the state are not always culture-neutral. A brief account of Nepal’s 
business history shows that there have been deep cultural overtones to the way entrepreneurs 
are treated by the state. This paper reconstructs Nepal’s modern history spanning half a century 
to highlight how business elites from certain caste and ethnic groups have flourished in Nepal 
during the rules of the caste-based muluki ain and monarchy-based panchayat. It examines the 
nature of multi-party democracy which claimed to adopt an ethnically neutral polity but did little 
about the already existing ethnic marginalization and discontent. It then examines the way in 
which the rise of the Maoists added a new dimension to the continuity of the rules of the game.  
While the Maoists seem to take some credit for finally unpacking the old baggage of caste and 
ethnicity in the way Nepali state politics is run, it has to be said that the nature of the struggle 
has been implicit within Nepali history long before they came to dominate Nepali politics. 
introdUction
In her discussion of the rise of new corporatism 
in India, Barbara Harriss-White (2005) argued that 
market forces alone are inadequate to guarantee 
livelihood and life; hence it draws on non-market 
forms of exchange such as reciprocity, redistribution 
and patronage to sustain itself. Such forms of 
exchange may be embedded in the broader social, 
cultural and political trajectories followed by the 
state and civil society institutions that get reworked 
to be instruments of business regulation. I present 
a complementary case on Nepal following this 
framework.  Ethnic factors have regulated the Nepali 
economy and resisted state influence for the past 
several centuries.  The study of the embeddedness of 
ethnically based factors into business organization 
can inform studies of contemporary politics and 
society in Nepal. Yet there is little conversation among 
the disciplines of economics, sociology and political 
science about Nepal that explores capitalism’s 
link with the broader social and political order. 
How has the current political transition affected 
modern business organization in Nepal, and is it 
materially different from the past? Does the natural 
pragmatism that characterizes businessmen 
preclude their being proselytized into ethnicity-
charged politics? More importantly, to what extent 
is ethnicity a new variable that has come to dominate 
Nepali politics and to what extent is it a new 
manifestation of an old phenomenon?  These will 
be the key questions this article will try to address 
in its two parts.  The first part of the article is a 
historiography of entrepreneurship-related policies 
and practices; the second, an ethnography of the 
modern entrepreneurship-related organizations 
that dominate contemporary policy-making.  The 
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the case of India she focuses wholly on caste – in capitalistic 
transformations. Civil society, in the Gramscian view, consists 
of economic and social movements which may work to develop 
a counter-narrative that may eventually undermine bourgeois 
hegemony that usually evolves from interest groups protected 
by an undemocratic or semi-democratic state. In the case of 
India of the twenty-first century, where the parameters of 
accumulation are changing fast, dominant social institutions 
like caste are being reworked rapidly into a corporatist order or 
collective organization of economic interests.  Harriss-White 
argues that caste has provided an ‘ideological backcloth’ 
or a whole institutional structure on which the corporatist 
project can function. Modern institutions such as business 
associations, labor unions and even political parties follow 
capitalistic norms but are shaped in their actions by primordial 
caste hierarchies. Her ethnographic account of a small South 
Indian town, Arni, shows how caste continues to supply the 
broader entrepreneurial order necessary for corporatism in 
modern India, which is entrusted either to the state or the 
pure capitalist forces in other countries.  This assertion holds 
true for Nepal with regards to its ethnic order.
All three approaches share the idea that economic actions 
are embedded in the norms and networks of the social order. 
They point out the inadequacies of neoclassical economics 
and question the claims of political theorists that state politics 
arise from the power of guns, votes and street protests alone. 
They make the case that modern orders are continuously 
negotiated on factory shopfloors, boardrooms and through 
class connections.  Old cultural histories construct the 
narrative necessary for positioning of various social groups 
(caste or ethnic) for negotiations; ongoing political and 
economic developments both revise and reproduce histories; 
and eventually old institutions are reshaped  by the forces 
of modernity and pragmatism.  Collectively, the three 
strands of this literature indicate some opportunities for 
greater crossover between the boundaries of the disciplines 
of economics, sociology and politics.  This indeed will be 
the aim of the following section which provides a historical 
account that may explain how today’s ethnic order in Nepal 
is the work of the past.
cUltUrAl politicS And mArKetS
Based both on secondary historical sources and by 
my ethnography of businessmen, I reconstruct below a 
comprehensive history of the Nepali politico-economy.  My 
aim is to counter the popular claim that the Maoists brought 
ethnicity into Nepali politics (Bhattarai, 1998), and to propose 
that ethnicity is not a new element in the way Nepali state and 
society has functioned over the past five centuries.  It will 
be fair to say however that Maoist politics which gave rise to 
the politicization of the ethnic movements have added new 
dimensions to state-society relations.
From medieval times to the rana regime
Caste and ethnicity have been central to both industrial 
paper begins however with a discussion of the conceptual 
frameworks examining this complex problem.
cUltUre, politicS And bUSineSS 
prAgmAtiSm:  A conceptUAl FrAmeworK
Far from being remote from political processes, or 
rooted solely in the linear modeling of classical economics, 
the nesting of individual actions of businessmen and others 
within the broader norms of social class and politics were 
argued famously by North (1990) and Bourdieu (1984). They 
take ‘habitus’ or ‘institutions’ as their starting point which 
consists of a whole range of values, ethical orientation and 
preferences that take shape through an individual’s early 
life experiences involving socialization in family, peer and 
social groups.  It is further argued that broader organizations 
– business, political and social – evolve from the collective 
culture of people through a process that is negotiated, revised 
and reinstated time and again giving the society a certain 
distinction.
The idea of social distinction is pursued further in 
the empirical work of Clegg et al (1990) who argue that 
capitalisms have taken distinct shapes across societies, 
countries and regions. A particular case they discuss is that of 
the two contrasting models of capitalism that have developed 
in the East and the West owing to broader political and social 
systems surrounding the immediate ways of doing business 
in enterprises.  It was argued that the enmeshing that takes 
place between the strategies of businessmen, the vision of 
politicians and the realities of the social and legal orders gives 
rise to the overall institutional framework for the organiaation 
of economic action, which may lie somewhere in the range 
between the authoritarian democratic type (as in East Asia) 
and the liberal democratic type (as in Europe, the United 
States and Australia).
Within society-economy embeddedness, Whitley (1999) 
has conceptualized a new framework, a ‘comparative-
business-systems approach’ (CBS) to anatomize business 
organizations and their interconnectedness with political, 
labor and cultural systems.  The core of the CBS approach is 
the comparison of business systems across societies on the 
three important fronts of capital generation, employment 
structure and business alliance-building. Whitley then places 
business systems into the broader institutional structuring 
which includes state-entrepreneur relationships, business 
associations and labor unions.  His account of the capitalisms 
of Korea, Taiwan and Japan highlights the extent to which 
contemporary capitalisms in these countries, as distinct from 
each other as they may be, draw on similar social institutions 
of individual and collective loyalties as much as on their 
political histories of war and the bureaucratic arrangements 
for power sharing between the state and industrial groups.
Harriss-White (2005) connects the discussion of society-
enterprise embeddedness with civil society discourse. Her 
framework of the social structure of accumulation (SSA) 
further focuses on the role of civil society institutions – in 
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and foreign policy making in Nepal. Medieval Nepal’s 
comparative business advantages lay solely in trade with 
Tibet in which the Buddhist Newars established a monopoly 
for a long time.  The lowest two of the dozen passes that 
went into Tibet from the southern plains – Kuti and Kyirong 
– passed via the Kathmandu Valley while marriage of the 
Nepali princess Bhrikuti with the legendary Tibetan king 
Srong Btsan Sgam Po opened the way for Nepali acculturation 
of Tibet along the lines of Buddhist spiritual and material 
arts.  Although the Nepal-Tibet trade was regulated by the 
treaties sealed by Newar rulers dating back as early as 1650, 
the Shah and Rana rulers could never penetrate the lucrative 
Nepal-Tibet trade even after they defeated the Newars in war.
Three violent wars between Nepal and Tibet mark the 
transition as the Shah dynasty took charge of Nepali foreign 
affairs. The first war of 1786 was waged to settle disputes over 
the purity of Tibetan coins minted in Nepal.  The second war 
of 1791 stemmed from disputes arising from the fact that 
Nepal had given protection to Syamarpa Lama, a high profile 
Tibetan political refugee.  A third war was fought in 1855 
in the aftermath of Tibet’s (and China’s) refusal to support 
Nepal in its resistance to an assault from the British East 
India Company in the south.  Tibet’s response to Nepal’s plea 
for help clearly showed that it retained a grudge against the 
Shahs for displacing the Newar rulers from the Kathmandu 
Valley.
Although the Buddhist Newars remained the ethnic group 
that dominated trade with Tibet, they were increasingly 
regulated by the Shah regime, as seen in the new taxes and 
order of ritual purification imposed on them. It should also 
be noted that the Ranas ruled under a strictly caste/ethnicity-
based common law (muluki ain) which took its roots from 
the ancient Hindu doctrine Manusmriti.1  This law forbade 
non-trader castes to engage in entrepreneurial activities.
Eventually, Nepal’s comparative advantage over the 
Tibet trade began to dwindle in the late nineteenth century. 
Geographically, the British opened a new route via Sikkim 
in 1877 and subsequently linked it with a railroad between 
Darjeeling and Kolkata in 1881.  Politically, Sir Francis 
Younghusband’s Tibet expedition of 1904 – ironically assisted 
by the contemporary Rana regime of Nepal – imposed a new 
treaty on Tibet to end Nepal’s legal monopoly over Tibet’s 
foreign trade and initiated direct trade links with the East 
India Company via Darjeeling (Acharya, 1999: 233 and 
Whelpton, 2005: 77).  Further, after the Chinese invaded 
Tibet in 1950 and closed the border with Nepal in 1959, 
the Nepal-Tibet trade came to a standstill (Rankin, 2004). 
With it came the demise of the glory of the Buddhist Newar 
1. In fact, upon his return from a legendary tour to the United 
Kingdom, the first Rana prime minister Jung Bahadur Rana had it codified 
in 1854 in his attempt to give Nepal its magna carta or the first codified 
legal document.  It should be clarified however that this was never meant 
to be a document about protection of the rights of the people as the  magna 
carta was.
traders.
By the mid-1880s, British India was exerting an 
overwhelming influence on Nepal and under its blessing, 
the Ranas emerged as formidable rulers powerful enough to 
dictate to the legitimate Shah monarchs and intermarry into 
their families.  In return for their military support in quelling 
the first Indian Sepoy uprising in 1857, the British returned 
Nepal four bordering districts in the far west, Banke, Bardia, 
Kailali and Kanchanpur which later came to be known as 
the naya muluk (new territories).  There was a great deal of 
ambiguity as to whether this land was given as personal gifts 
or birta to the Ranas or returned to the state of Nepal (Regmi, 
1999).  There was equally a great deal of ambiguity as to 
whether the Shahs or the Ranas were the real kings of Nepal. 
Amidst such vagueness, the Ranas launched an ambitious 
project that established the first tier of modern manufacturing 
in Nepal, which decisively favored Indian businessmen over 
indigenous Newar businessmen in developing trade and 
industrial links with British India.
Still under the overwhelming Indian (British) influence, 
the Ranas issued pragyapan patra (state letter) to invite 
Marwari businessmen from North India to establish various 
commercial manufacturing and processing plants as well 
as to develop distribution of networks in Nepal for Indian 
consumer goods.2  The first modern industry in Nepal – a jute 
mill – was established in 1936 by Radha Kissen Chamaria, 
a Kolkata businessman, in joint partnership with Juddha 
Shamsher Rana, Prime Minister at the time.  In 1942 two 
paper mills were established in joint partnership with the 
Ranas and the Marwaris (Gaige, 1975).  Processing plants for 
matches, cigarettes, rice and vegetable oil were established in 
the same area soon afterwards, mostly to fill in the shortages 
caused by World War II, and were again jointly owned by 
the Marwaris and the Ranas.  The Marwaris remained in 
Nepal as a minority group, comprising a mere 0.2 per cent 
of Nepal’s population (Whelpton, 2005: 9), but importantly, 
because of the proximity to the infrastructure developed in 
the Tarai after deforestation removed the natural border of 
the charkose jhadi forests, the overall access to the so-called 
‘open-border’ between Nepal and India remained in the 
hands of the Marwaris along with other local residents of the 
Tarai, i.e., the Madhesis.
the Panchayati era: State protection of business and 
politics
The Rana regime was overthrown in 1951 by a popular 
2. The Ranas were not the first to develop caste-based decrees for 
economic vocations.  Similar caste-based formal policies have been seen 
in Nepal as early as the seventeenth century.  Siddhi Narsingha Malla had 
invited a priest clan from South India to serve as the designated priests 
in Pashupatinath temple.  The arrival of the Rajkarnikars as confetionary 
producers and Rjopadhyayas and Kayasthas as Hindu priests further 
supported caste-based policies prevalent in medieval Nepal.
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discretion with regard to business enterprises.  The first three 
National Economic Plans – of 1956, 1962 and 1965 – explicitly 
declared state protection for cottage and small industries, and 
implicitly sought to protect all other industries from foreign 
competition.  The Industrial Act of 1974, on the one hand, 
standardized the definitions and procedures in various 
business laws and controlled enterprise proliferation through 
quotas and licenses; on the other, it dished out generous 
state subsidies to entrepreneurs in the forms of banking and 
tax concessions.  For example, selected village and cottate 
industries were given five year tax holiday. The Industrial Act 
of 1981 announced an even more generous, non-discretionary 
six-year tax holiday for all cottage industries.  This was to 
be followed by a series of yet other subsidies and incentives, 
including a discretionary tax exemption for industries 
producing or distributing essential goods and infrastructure. 
A Nine-Point Export Promotion Program was introduced in 
1984 that allowed exporters access to concessional credit; 
the Nepal Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC), a 
government-controlled capital investment entity was directed 
to compulsorily allocate ten per cent of its investment in 
export industries.  The nature of the state protection of various 
industrial sectors however did little to correct the caste and 
ethnic biases that had influenced state allocation of resources 
for centuries; if anything, it exacerbated this by letting the 
subsidies be captured by the Bahun-Chhetri elites within the 
status quo.
Although this was not the intention of economic 
restructuring, poor attention to ethnic implications led to a 
situation where the best protected industries went into the 
hands of the ruling elites and their allies while marginalized 
caste and ethnic groups proliferated in the least protected 
industries.  For example, the trans-Himalayan trade, which 
was once a grand cultural trade, had by then shrunk into an 
insignificant bartering of salt and other basic necessities, and 
was now dominated by rural Newars and Sherpas.  In contrast, 
the National Salt Trading Corporation, a modern lucrative 
parastatal that had gained the monopoly over distribution of 
essential commodities throughout the nation was dominated 
by the Marwaris and the Bahun-Chhetris (Zivetz, 1992: 67). 
In manufacturing, only 60 garment factories were deemed 
eligible to export in 1984.  They then collected rent from over 
1,000 unregistered factories called ‘fabricators’ who would do 
all the work but had no access to export channels.  Most of 
these registered factories were owned by Bahun-Chhetris or 
Marwaris (Shakya, 2004).  The situation changed as soon as 
the government liberalized international trade and domestic 
firm registration (see below).
democratization and economic liberalization
The People’s Movement of 1990, which overthrew the 
pro-monarchy Panchayat system, has to be understood at 
different levels.  At one level, it was the street protests that 
forced King Birendra to legalize political parties, curtail his 
own powers and allow a new constitution. At another level, it 
uprising led by King Tribhuvan and an alliance of democratic 
political parties. This change of regime initially gave Nepal 
a new democratic constitution and a new civil code that 
eventually replaced the caste/ethnicity-based common law 
(muluki ain).  However, this movement did nothing to change 
the fact that all political powers remained in the grip of the 
Bahun-Chhetri rulers.  Although the Ranas had reacted to 
the popular movement by brutally suppressing it at all levels, 
the muluki ain had been so powerful an institution that they 
could not do away with caste-based treatment even when 
responding to such serious charges as treason.  For example, 
when the existence of the first Nepali political party Praja 
Parishad was discovered by the regime and all its leaders 
captured, , four were either publicly hanged or shot to death, 
but Tanka Prasad Acharya, a Bahun, had to be spared.  The 
common law had categorically defined bramha-hatya, a 
murder of a Bahun, to be a sin more heinous than even a 
proven case of treason.  As James Fisher (1997) has argued 
in his seminal book Living Martyrs, the principles of caste/
ethnicity-based purity and pollution widely dictated the 
contemporary common law that prevailed under the Rana 
regime.  Not surprisingly, the first generation of political 
leaders who survived the brutal oppression of the Rana 
regime was almost exclusively Bahuns, a legacy that continues 
to haunt Nepal after half a century.
In the national election that followed the promulgation 
of the new constitution, the Bahun-Chhetris who were 
numerically a minority were overwhelmingly represented 
in the new parliament, while the indigenous nationalities 
and low caste people were grossly underrepresented.  This 
paved the way for the passage of the controversial economic 
and governance policies that established the Bahuns as the 
primary beneficiaries of economic protection by the state. 
A good example is the controversial Civil Service Act of 
1956, which was widely criticized by the representatives of 
the Janajatis for being pro-Hindu and pro-Sanskrit (Seddon, 
2001: 87-91). On entrepreneurship, the Business Companies 
Act of 1951 was of key importance. In theory, it encouraged 
all castes and ethnicities to engage in business enterprises, 
but in practice failed to correct unequal distribution of wealth 
among cultural groups.  As a result, no longer forbidden from 
seeking profit-making ventures, the Bahun-Chhetri elites 
quickly tapped into the business opportunities opened up by 
the new policy.  The marginalized ethnic groups with little 
wealth of their own had no means to generate capital to set 
up in business. 
Over ninety new private joint stock companies were 
registered between 1951 and 1964 under the Company Act 
of 1951, and over 70 per cent of the ownership lay in the 
hands of the Bahun-Chhetris and the Marwaris (Zivetz, 
1992). It is true that several Newars, Thakalis and Lamas also 
commenced their business ventures during this period, but 
the Bahun-Chhetris emerged as the group that gained the 
most by Nepal’s economic modernization.  
The 1970s and 1980s saw a rapid increase in state 
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was the King’s 1989 arms deal with China that had angered 
India so much that it responded by sealing the Nepal-India 
border until Nepal virtually ran out of daily necessities 
such as petrol, oil and sugar for three months.  In any case, 
the new Nepali constitution defined Nepal as a ‘multi-
ethnic, multi-lingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, 
sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom’3 
Indigenous nationalities and minority religious activists 
were very disappointed that the word Hindu still remained; 
nonetheless, the addition of the word ‘multi-ethnic’ was a 
genuinely new departure.  
Soon after, in 1992, the new government issued a new 
Industrial Act which spelled out a radical program embracing 
economic liberalization.  Although Nepal had signed two 
important policy lending contracts with the World Bank 
and the IMF in 1986 and 1989 agreeing to deregulate the 
domestic market and international trade, it was not until the 
change in political regime that it truly  implemented them. 
Like elsewhere, Nepalis equated multi-party democracy 
with market-based capitalism, evidenced in that even the 
most conservative of the socialists and communists could 
not dissociate the two.  The Communist Party of Nepal 
(United Marxist-Leninist) dropped its Maoist ideal in 1989, 
and participated in the movement for the restoration of 
democracy, thereafter which it consolidated its approval of 
competitive democracy and free-market capitalism in its 
People’s Multiparty Democracy resolution in 1993. It has 
also to be noted that the finance minister of the interim 
cabinet of 1990 that chartered the first outline of economic 
liberalization in Nepal was a well-known socialist, Devendra 
Raj Panday.
On the ethnic front, the 1990 movement gave rise to 
an ‘ethnogenesis’ similar to what happened in India during 
the time of independence, and for rather similar reasons 
(Whelpton, 2005; Gellner, 2003).  The formerly marginalized 
castes and ethnic groups felt that they had been liberated by 
the demise of the Panchayat ideology that had claimed that 
all Nepalis were the same, while in practice institutionalizing 
high caste Bahun-Chhetri supremacy.  Symbolic changes 
were made by the Nepali state in media and communication, 
including broadcasting in regional languages and revising 
the definition of the Nepali national costume.  However, the 
new constitution gave little room for much expected ethnic 
liberation, and Nepal officially remained a Hindu kingdom. 
Much has been written about how the newly granted rights to 
freely organize gave a new impetus to already existing ethnic 
associations of several indigenous nationalities (Hangen, 
2007).
A series of important legal and policy measures followed 
the liberal industrial policy of 1992.  Most of the public 
subsidies were discontinued and entry/exit barriers in the 
forms of lengthy bureaucratic procedures and licensing 
restrictions were removed so that access to entrepreneurial 
3. Nepali Constitution 1991: 4 (1).
opportunities was no longer confined to selected population 
groups.  Tariff and non-tariff barriers were reduced 
significantly, making Nepal the first South Asian country 
to have trade policies comparable to East Asia in the early 
1990s (Acharya et al, 1998).  Further, the Foreign Investment 
and Technology Transfer Act of 1996 not only allowed one 
hundred per cent foreign investments in business ventures 
without having to find a Nepali business partner, but also 
eased controls on capital repatriation.  Further, an Industrial 
Promotion Board was set up in 1997 to ensure effective 
monitoring of the implementation of the policies that were 
adopted. A series of business membership organizations 
evolved in time to facilitate further dialogue between the 
public and private sectors on issues affecting business 
operations. These directly attacked the interests of the state 
protected business elites who were now forced to compete 
both with domestic and foreign rivals, and on both fronts in 
local and global markets.
Economic liberalization was never going to be the 
panacea. The caste- and ethnicity-based grievances relating 
to both business and politics were not fully addressed by 
either democracy or liberalization. One of the reasons some 
business houses remained more privileged than others within 
the so-called market-based competitive capitalism is the way 
issues of caste and ethnicity remain indispensable to the 
way societies and bureaucracies function in Nepal. In Nepal, 
capitalism and democracy are practiced by businessmen, 
politicians and bureaucrats through caste- and ethnicity-
based cognition, networks and orders.  Among 33 business 
partnerships within the garment manufacturing industry 
that I surveyed in 2002, I found only one factory that was 
a business partnership between indigenous nationalities 
and a Bahun-Chhetri/Indian.  All others were business 
partnerships among two or more groups of Bahun-Chhetris, 
Marwaris, Madheshis and Indian nationals. When asked 
why businessmen do not build partnerships with people 
of other cultural groups, several businessmen emphasized 
the importance of culture-derived trust while operating in 
a business environment characterized by extremely weak 
legal measures on protection of intellectual property rights 
and other property rights, as well as protection against sheer 
fraudulent transactions (Shakya, 2007).
At any rate, it will be fair to say that Nepal’s new 
economic policies at best aim to ‘tolerate’ the marginalized 
cultural groups and call for harmony among caste and 
ethnic groups than proactively ensure that diverse identities 
among the population are truly empowered. The state has 
turned a blind eye to deeply rooted hierarchy between the 
ruling and non-ruling caste/ethnic elites and further on 
to the lower castes and marginalized ethnic groups. The 
privileged signifier of equal treatment was actually nothing 
of the sort – it stimulated unequal responses.  In fact, 
competitive patronage has had profound implications for 
the business enterprises as well as for state politics. Nepali 
liberalization and democracy has produced such a political 
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seasonality of production and lack of predictability of business 
which meant that owners could only afford informal and 
semi-contracted job opportunities.  In other cases, workers 
were controlled through kin and ethnic networks such that 
they put the family and ethnic loyalty before class loyalty. In 
any case, businessmen did their best to keep stronger labor 
unions at bay in several of the manufacturing industries and 
in their place nurture pro-capitalist labor unions.4  Labor 
union movement was to face draconian changes with the 
arrival of the Maoists (see section 5).
business associations
Since most of the business associations were remnants 
of the pre-democracy protectionist regime when only elites 
could register (more lucrative) businesses, they had small 
memberships and functioned more like business clubs that 
maintained loyalty to the royals and other ruling elites.  It 
is an irony that little of this actually changed for several 
industries even after the democratic movement and economic 
liberalization in the early 1990s. One should not infer from this 
that the businessmen had no involvement in the democratic 
movement.  To the contrary, employees, employers and owners 
of several large business houses had marched the streets arm 
in arm to call for democracy.  What was probably true for 
several industries was that although the economic regime and 
the government regulations had changed significantly, the 
state had only weak relations with businesses when it came 
to actual business operations.  But there were exceptions to 
these involving business associations that deal with industrial 
sectors that require closer government support and hence 
stronger joint action among business members to obtain this. 
The three business associations – the garment, carpet and 
handicraft associations – which gained great prominence 
at various points of time, had worked towards such joint 
action in order to solve immediate challenges looming over 
their businesses.  Their work exemplifies the pragmatism I 
have argued to be inherent among businessmen through 
which they negotiate complex political and cultural power 
constellations within which they function. To make my point, 
I will briefly describe the case of the Garment Association of 
Nepal (GAN).
GAN was established with less than 30 business members 
in 1987 but its membership had grown to over a thousand 
by 1995.  Before liberalization in 1992, most of the garment 
factories functioned as informal businesses selling to the 
elite exporters because the access to the American market, 
where most of the Nepali garments went, were restricted to 
4. In one extreme case, a garment factory in Kathmandu actively 
mobilized the local Nepali Congress leader to arbitrate with local residents 
on disputes related to land acquisition and utility consumption, as well as 
to facilitate matters of local philanthropy.  For such services, this factory 
not only paid the NC leader regular party ‘donations’ but also recruited 
some of the Congress’ political cadres into the factory workforce for a closer 
vigilance. (source: fieldwork, 2001-2004)  
outcome because of the operation of the very institutions 
which should have been designed to eliminate the influence 
of elite discrimination in both business operations and social 
representation systems.
ethnic nUAnceS in new civil Society 
orgAniZAtionS
As discussed above, modernization and democratization 
have not necessarily led to an ethnicity-neutral socio-
entrepreneurial order in Nepal.  Modern organizations 
continue to be characterized by the same ethnic divides as 
the old ones.  This section will focus on the extent to which 
ethnicity adds a dimension to the implicit power struggle 
intrinsic among the various associations representing 
contesting interests within an entrepreneurial order. 
labor unionism
Labor unionism has been a consistent feature of almost 
all political grievances in Nepal for a long time.  As early 
as 1975, the labor cadre of the Nepali Congress party had 
led a historic labor ‘slow-down’ at Biratnagar Jute Mills (the 
country’s oldest), under the leadership of G.P. Koirala who 
later rose to preside over the ruling Nepali Congress and 
serve multiple terms as Prime Minister.  Various streams of 
the moderate and radical communist parties that proliferated 
in Nepal have historically also commanded strong support 
from factory workers.  The tradition of formally registering 
as labor unions, however, came much later.  Although the 
Nepal Factory Workers’ Act 1986 made some provisions for 
labor rights, the Panchayat regime effectively maintained a 
ban on overall labor unionism to the effect that the first labor 
union of Nepal, the General Federation of Nepal Trade Union 
(GEFONT), was founded underground in 1989.  The labor 
wing of the Nepali Congress was consolidated into the Nepal 
Trade Union Congress (NTUC) only in 1991.  Both these 
unions underwent cycles of mergers and splits following the 
trends in their base party politics.  Although GEFONT divided 
into as many as four splinter groups at times, it recombined 
after the 1990 democratic movement.  Within the NTUC, 
however, a splinter group went on to found the Democratic 
Confederation of Nepalese Trade Unions (DECONT) in 
January 2001 as the so-called chattise (thirty-six) dissident 
parliamentarians from within the Nepali Congress, implicitly 
led by the former prime minister, K.P. Bhatterai, challenged 
G.P. Koirala’s leadership in parliament.  On a different front, 
the Maoists had also already formed their own All Nepal 
Labor Union – Revolutionary (ANLUR) in 1996 (Manandhar, 
2001: 62).
A key issue that has gone unnoticed among the scholars 
of labor unionism in Nepal is that of the global changes in 
business organization that were fast seeping in. Although 
the labor union movement significantly strengthened in the 
early and mid-1990s, it never really meaningfully claimed a 
space in industries with major industrial significance, e.g., 
garment, handicraft and tourism. In some cases it was extreme 
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only few, most of them Bahun-Chhetris and Marwaris.  After 
economic liberalization, the readymade garment industry 
(RMG) was among the few industries that became subject 
to draconian reforms largely owing to the pressures of the 
international RMG heavyweights such as the United States. 
Once business regulations were simplified and made more 
transparent, allowing non-elite businessmen to join, GAN 
soon emerged as a formidable lobbying force in the mid and 
late 1990s.  Even then—or maybe especially because of this 
—GAN leadership hardly went out of the hands of the ruling 
elites.  Within the GAN executive committee (of 21 people), 
50 per cent were Bahun-Chhetris, 29 per cent Marwaris and 
a further 9 per cent were Newars. There was only one non-
Newar indigenous nationalities member of the GAN executive 
committee.  Most of the GAN members noted, without being 
prompted, that most of the past and present Presidents of 
GAN were either Bahun-Chhetris or Marwaris with just two 
exceptions who were Newars.  On who would be the most 
suitable candidate for GAN presidency, members said that 
they must have access to the ‘top level’ of government.  “He 
can be anything or anyone, but he should have excellent 
contacts to ministers and secretaries, and he should be 
willing and able to use those contacts for the greater good 
of GAN members,” said one GAN member, describing his 
criteria for a competent GAN President.  Although a majority 
of GAN members were Hindus, they did not require that 
high caste Bahun-Chhetris should be their leaders, but since 
members of those castes happened to be the political elites 
and enjoyed greater access to the government, the pragmatic 
outcome among the businessmen was that they were elected 
as the GAN leaders.
In terms of business representation and effective policy 
advocacy, comparisons have been drawn between GAN 
and a wider sample of business associations which were 
less central to policymaking. Zivetz (1992), for example, 
discusses how the Trans-Himalayan Trade Association, once 
involved in lucrative Nepal-Tibet trade between the elites 
of the two countries but now confined to the meager barter 
of salt and other basic commodities between the bordering 
Himalayan populations, was dominated by the indigenous 
nationalities. In contrast, a lucrative and state-controlled 
National Salt Trading Corporation which controlled 
distribution channels of goods of daily necessity to the entire 
population was dominated by the Bahun-Chhetris and 
Marwaris. However, Newars and other caste or ethnic groups 
continue to dominate several business associations involved 
in production or exchange at a lower scale where market 
forces somewhat offset state regulations.5  For these various 
reasons, the Federation of Nepali Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (FNCCI) is among few institutions where Bahun-
Chhetri dominance is less pronounced.
Cultural dominance is more than reversed in some of 
5. Examples my include the Small Traders’ Association, the Retailers’ 
Association and several others.
the more specialized businesses.  For example, the carpet 
association was one whose leaders had difficulty reaching 
the ministers despite contributing to as much as a quarter of 
national exports just because they were not Bahun-Chhetris 
or Marwaris and did not have close connections with 
policymakers.  A second business association whose leaders 
were not the ruling elite was the Handicraft Association of 
Nepal (HAN). Since handicrafts relied on cultural legacies 
mostly confined to Newar artisans, over 80 per cent of the 
HAN business members were Newars and so were the HAN 
executive members.  Since they had little access to the key 
policymakers, they raised their own funds, or liaised with 
donors and buyers directly, and ran their developmental 
programs—most of them on skill development and 
certification of standards—with little government help.
As the situations change on the ethnic front, the 
business associations have emerged as among the first 
of civil society organizations which adapted to political 
changes pragmatically.  In case of the Garment Association 
of Nepal (GAN), they chose to involve their fellow business 
members and labor rights activists – many of whom came 
from indigenous nationalities who had better rapport with 
the Maoists than the Bahun-Chhetris and Marwaris -- to 
facilitate collective negotiations with the Maoists on behalf 
of the entire business association. The business associations 
of hotel and restaurant owners have followed the suit.  It is 
likely that several other business groups earlier seen to be 
conservatives and royalists will pragmatically adapt to the 
new ethno-politics.  I discuss below the broader political 
developments within which such pragmatic decisions were 
taken by the businessmen.
ArrivAl oF the mAoiStS: inStitUtionAl 
chAngeS Seep into bUSineSS 
orgAniZAtion
Much has been said about the evolution of the Maoist 
movement in Nepal in its initial phase 1996-2000 (Thapa 
and Sijapati, 2004; Hutt, 2004), but little has been discussed 
about the subsequent phase when the Maoists transformed 
from a purely militaristic force gaining momentum in the 
rural areas into one that overhauled its ideology and came to 
exert a formidable presence in the urban areas.  Hachhethu 
(2009) has attributed the Maoists’ adoption of the party 
proposal “Democracy in the Twenty-first Century,” as put 
forth during the negotiations with the government in 2003, 
to be its endorsement of multiparty democracy. It has to be 
acknowledged however that several preceding events have set 
the stage for this proposal, an important one being adoption 
of the Prachanda Path during its second national convention 
as early as in February 2001.  
Especially regarding business associations and labor 
unions which I have argued earlier were weak and 
vacuous, it can be said that the sudden emergence of the 
Maoist movement in Nepal came to fill the vacuum left by 
conventional institutions.  At least in the new industries, 
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Soon after, some of the leading businessmen were nominated 
by the Maoists to the constituent assembly to express their 
commitment to capitalism. Other major political parties 
followed suit. Multinational and bilateral donors were the 
second group Prachanda met to assure the protection of 
foreign investors. A few months later, however, the new budget 
brought forth a two-pillar model of competition and co-
operation. Along the lines of the East Asian model of capitalism 
where the states have picked and backed winners, the Maoists 
implicitly ushered in notions of ‘patriotic capitalism.’ On 
the one hand, this notion called for a shift from the state’s 
role as a neutral referee to that of a benevolent party with 
interests.  On the other hand, this notion formally confirmed 
the Maoists’ intention to pronounce positive discrimination 
for the marginalized population groups and for employment-
generating activities.  On both counts, this reaffirmed their 
commitment to caste and ethnicity as relevant factors in 
decision making, which they had consistently maintained 
throughout the 2000s.
It should be noted that the Madhesi countermovement 
that followed the April 2006 uprising has forced the Maoists 
to take up a more politically pragmatic position than what 
they had earlier promised to the marginalized caste and ethnic 
activists. Three Madhesi factions – the armed Jwala Singh 
and Goit groups as well as the Matrika Yadav group – have 
already splintered off from the Maoist party over disputes that 
the Maoists had reduced their commitment to the Madhesi 
people. On the other hand, the indigenous nationalities in 
the eastern and central hills are being more vocal about the 
autonomous ethnic states the Maoists had earlier announced. 
Very little has been said or done about how these competing 
and conflicting demands for autonomy from various ethnic 
and regional groups are to be accommodated. Even less has 
been said about the economic and industrial implications of 
such demands.
conSolidAting the ethniciZAtion oF 
clASS ideology into politicAl And 
mArKet liberAliSm
Following the distinct waves of conquest, of trade, and 
culture-nuanced business evolution in Nepal, it is only to 
be expected that both markets and hierarchies would be 
multidimensional. While cultural ideas deal with experiences 
that far transcend both economic and political lives, there is 
nonetheless a relationship between a plurality of cultures 
and businesses, contrary to what the neoclassical economic 
literature might lead one to believe. The economy would 
not take the form it does were it not for the civil society 
organizations that set the stage for the market, even though 
the effects are complicated and counter-intuitive at times. 
What the civil society organizations are today, on the other 
hand are the complex makings of the historical negotiations 
of the past.
Yet there has been virtually no research into the cultural 
implications for economic activity or the fact that a business 
the Maoists effectively dismantled the status-quo of capital-
friendly labor unions. The Prachanda Path called on the 
Maoist cadres to move their focus from the periphery to 
the centre and to build mobilizing fronts among the factory 
workers and students.  They did this by raising the flags of 
patriotism (by voicing an anti-India rhetoric), indigeneity 
(by setting the ‘Indian’ Marwaris against the supposedly 
indigenous Newars and other Janajatis), and communism 
(by setting the so-called ‘feudal’ castes of Bahun-Chhetris 
against the lower castes and by imposing radically anti-
capitalist demands on behalf of the workers).  On all three 
counts, labor intensive industries like garments and tourism 
became the easy victims.  On donation-seeking by Maoists 
for their political campaigns, Bahun-Chhetri and Marwari 
businessmen received especially hostile treatment from the 
Maoists while indigenous nationalities were able to negotiate 
far more effectively with the Maoist cadres. On labor 
unionism, Maoists covertly infiltrated the factory floors of 
the Kathmandu Valley, easily weakening the labor bases of 
NTUC and GEFONT (Shakya, 2008).
Beyond immediate meso-level organizations like labor 
unions and business associations, the Maoists have successfully 
cashed in on the post-1990 ethnic upsurge by accumulating 
political capital and creating a political framework for the key 
ethnic demands: autonomy and federalism. In the new context 
of competitive politics since the April 2006 mass uprising 
and removal of the monarchy, they have further consolidated 
their claim as an ethnic messiah.  It is true that this has been 
somewhat weakened by the counter movements staged by the 
Madhesis and later on some of the hill Janajatis.  Nevertheless, 
the Maoists have continued to emphasize ethnicization and 
regionalization of its internal party structure throughout the 
major transformation it is seeking from a militaristic party 
organization into a civic one.  The Maoists now have caste, 
ethnicity and region-based organizations, from district to 
central levels, which have come to peripheralize three of 
the four sets of organizational structures it had maintained 
during the insurgency period.6  Overshadowing the old 
radical structures are the evolving network of Janasewa Samiti 
(public service committees) which are being developed in 
urban areas to perform civic duties including establishment 
of public grievance systems on issues related to business, 
social justice and development, among others.
Especially regarding the business issues, the Maoists 
seem to be working to accommodate their agenda on state 
restructuring within which economic agendas are prominent. 
Businessmen were indeed the first group Prachanda met after 
winning the national elections in 2008, to whom he assured 
protection of personal property and a free market regime. 
6.  The four organizational structures of the Maoists during the 
insurgency period included: (i) party organization top down including 
headquarters, central committees, regional, area and village committees; 
(ii) the nine Jana Sarkars or the parallel governments; (iii) military chain of 
command; and (iv) Jan Adalat or the people’s courts. (Hachhethu, 2009: 65).
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structure is embedded within a plurality of orders. Nepali 
policymakers and political scientists had been in denial of 
cultural politics altogether until the Nepali Maoists opened 
a Pandora’s box.  Even though the study of the Maoist 
movement has now taken centre stage, culture scholars 
have hardly looked into the plurality of orders that are 
influencing the Nepali market.  Harriss-White (2005), whose 
framework on the culture-economy nexus informs this paper 
substantially, laments that this has received little attention 
despite being so central to people’s lives and the politics of 
the state.  She points out that this may have to do with the fact 
that one part of this question relates to formalist neoclassical 
economics while the other part relates to anthropology – the 
two disciplines that have rarely worked together.
The politics of the Nepali Maoists have in some way 
forced both policymakers and politicians to acknowledge 
the direct interlinkages between culture and economics on 
the one hand and culture and politics on the other.  In this 
paper, I have articulated the key question that can no longer 
be avoided after this acknowledgement: Why have issues of 
ethnicity not faded away as a force in modern business and 
politics?  What is going to be different in the coming years as 
Nepal embraces the former rebels into mainstream politics 
and compels them to revise their basic ideological premises 
in favor of political, economic and cultural pluralism?
The social order has proven to be anything but static.  It 
is the ongoing struggles within the traditional social order 
(ethnic in case of Nepal) which has fed both politics and 
business. Ethnic struggles have taken on new dimensions 
through the uprising of the 1990 movement and the eruption 
of the Maoist insurgency.  The everyday ethnic order 
continues to be underpinned by both tacit acceptance and 
contestation of the hierarchy among multiple ethnic groups. 
The outcome is a reconsolidation of the social order which 
neither permits an authentic-false dichotomy nor a one-time 
event but a ‘mimesis’ of the original order which undergoes a 
continuous process of change.
Ethno-politics persisted and lately became exacerbated 
out of the contradiction where the state allowed the 
disproportionate representation of a few ethnic groups in 
various state mechanisms but denied ethnic discontent in 
policy discourses. Nepal’s ethnic movements have become 
a way to resist this contradiction. With one ethnic group 
ruling the country along with a few others allied with them, 
cultural identities continue to inform the way businessmen 
and citizens interpret and respond to the situations around 
them.  As long as communities embody caste and ethnic 
identities, ethnic overtones will continue to inform the 
production and exchange behavior of businessmen.  Political 
relationships between cultural groups vary from loyalty, to 
alliance, rivalry, and attempts at domination.  Consequently, 
while the great bulk of state economic policy is framed in a 
universalist language entirely indifferent to the local power 
structures, its implementation is hardly ever indifferent to 
such power struggles.  Even when not asserting itself through 
positive or negative discrimination, policy will always etch 
itself out differentially across population groups according to 
the specific contexts, in this case cultural.
Cultural nuances of policies and politics crystallize better 
in interactions between individuals as well as in the dealings 
of business and labor associations. I have argued that during 
the era of multi-party democracy, the role of the latter 
has been minimal in catering to civic needs of their own 
constituencies, and they have continued to function to fulfill 
loyalties to the political rulers.  Thanks to the disruptive 
pressures businesses have undergone since the democratic 
movement of 1990 and rise of the Maoist movement, some of 
them have begun to use these associations for class actions. 
Labor unions have begun to call strikes on labor issues such 
as wages and job securities; business associations called 
for collective negotiations with the Maoists to determine 
appropriate ‘donations.’ As the Maoists strengthen their grip 
both on state power and urban civic grassroots movements, 
they are substantially restructuring the internal party 
structure to cover as much grounds on these fronts.  The 
Maoists’ Janasewa Samitis, which were formed to perform 
civic duties in urban areas, have now gained a new 
prominence to almost stand at par with most of their older 
organizational structures from the era of the People’s War. 
This suggests that political competitions are no longer going 
to be confined to parliament and street politics in Nepal 
in the coming days, but the much neglected buffer zones 
of business and workers’ associations—now influenced by 
Maoist civic organizations—are likely to play stronger roles 
in both articulating state politics and permeating it into 
cultural and class associations.
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